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Ideological Translation and Mass Communication: A Modernization or a Conflict Enterprise? A Case Study of Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya

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Abstract

This study aims to investigate the functional and dysfunctional roles of ideological translation and mass media in the Arab World and challenges naïve concepts of translation, like 'faithfulness' and 'loyalty' to the text writer, and of mass media like 'modernization', 'democratization', etc. It hypothesizes that both translation and mass communication can play a functional role promoting modernization and development or a dysfunctional one promoting chaos and conflict and that both have recently played a dysfunctional role in the Arab world.

The importance of the study is twofold. At the topic level: a)-Ideological translation has critical consequences on shaping the Arab societies; b)-If the ideology of translation and the translation of ideology are linked directly to mass media, then we can imagine the tremendous effects on message receivers, especially if we are talking about an age of globalization where the

international public opinion is shaped and reshaped by the dominant global media. At the theoretical level: a)-It attempts to fill in the gap in the literature on translation and mass communication in the Arab World; b)- It discusses this issue from a multidisciplinary perspective: translation studies and ideology, pragmatics, theory of power, theory of conflict in international relations and communication theories; let alone the English/Arabic duality which is quite rare in the literature.

The analysis of samples collected from Al-Jazeera English (AJE) and Arabic (AJA) and Al-Arabiya channels reveals many interesting results. Ideological translation has recently played a dysfunctional role in the Arab societies creating conflict areas. The internationally-dominated mass media, like Al-Jazeera, have been dysfunctional and promoted a neocolonial enterprise of chaos, conflicts and wars instead of modernization, development and peace. Such a role leads to grave distortions in message-content receivers' value and information system globally. Al Arabiya, on the other hand, as an example for confrontation media has a long way to go in order to be functional. There is a gap in translation and mass communication models accounting for their involvement in modernization or conflicts in the Arab societies. Consequences of dysfunctionality include, but not restricted to, an increase in terrorism. The U.S. and the West diligent attempts to convince the international public opinion of modernization are absolutely deceptive.

Keywords: Ideological translation, mass media effects, modernization, conflict, power

INTRODUCTION

Knowledge is power, but power is also knowledge. Power decides what is knowledge and what is not knowledge. -Claude Alvares (1992: 230)

In 1949 the U.S. President Henry Truman gave an important speech marking officially the end of WWII, an era of fascism and colonialism, and the beginning of a post-WWII period, an era of neocolonialism. The articulation of colonial discourse was negative in earlier eras, but it has become positive since 1949 talking about modernization and development in the 'underdeveloped' Third World. Mass media (traditionally used to inform, persuade and entertain) is claimed to have a new, major role in modernization and development.

The Arab region, since the eruption of the revolution in Tunisia 2011, has witnessed many political, economic, social and ideological problems; a matter which resulted in further complicating the Arab scene where each of the conflicting parties tries to use mass media to enhance its interests or their funders'. On the one hand, dominant mass media is used to deliver information, persuade, educate, socialize, set agendas, democratize societies and sometimes to spark international conflicts and wars. On the other, some media tries to face the situation.

This study aims to investigate the functional and dysfunctional roles of ideological translation and mass media in the Arab World and challenges naïve concepts of translation like 'faithfulness' and 'loyalty' to the text writer and of mass media like 'modernization' and 'democratization'. It hypothesizes that both

translation and mass communication can play a functional role promoting modernization and development or a dysfunctional one promoting chaos and conflict and that both have recently played a dysfunctional role in the Arab world.

Importance of the study:

At the topic level:

1-Ideological translation can have critical consequences on shaping the Arab societies.

2-If the ideology of translation and the translation of ideology are linked directly to mass media, then we can imagine the tremendous effects on message receivers, especially if we are talking about an age of globalization where the international public opinion is shaped and reshaped by the dominant global media.

At the theoretical level

1- It attempts to fill in the gap in the literature on translation and mass communication in the Arab World.

2- It discusses this issue from a multidisciplinary perspective: translation studies and ideology, pragmatics, the theory of power, the theory of conflict in international relations and communication theories; let alone the English/Arabic duality which is quite rare in the literature.

The objectives of the study are to: a) to analyse English and Arabic media discourse; b) to analyse the content of translated texts and compare them to

original texts; c) to deduce the dysfunctional or functional roles of translation and mass media in promoting development or modernization project.

Operational definitions

Ideology. The term 'ideology' is coined by A. Destutt de Tracy in 1796 to refer to the science of ideas. It is a set of ideas and beliefs suggested by the dominant class of a society to be adopted by all the society members in order to bring change into and maintain society (Eser 2014:284).

Ideology of translation and translation of ideology. Since translation is a socially regulated activity, the relative interests and positions of the participants decide to a great extent the production and then the reception of translation (Hermans1997:10,42). There are two perspectives of translation that arise to our minds immediately when we talk about translation and ideology. First, it can be the ideology of translation referring here to selecting specific texts to be translated and deliberately excluding others. Second, it is the translation of ideology referring to the communication of certain ideologies.

Power. The concept of power is central to the study of ideological translation and mass communication. Its meaning is contested. It is predominantly understood as control over resources and/or outcomes; however, scholars increasingly recognize that such a conception of power is inadequate. Hannah Arendt's conception of power as corresponding, in her words, "to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert," allows us to develop a typology of power that includes not only the dimension of power associated with domination, coercion, oppression, exploitation, military might, and violence,

but also the dimension relating to the capacity of a collectivity to stabilize and shape political order based on a horizontal social contract (Petersen 2011: abstract).

Modernization. The discourse on modernization implied what the Third World countries should be doing in order to be termed 'modernized' or 'developed'- instead of being 'underdeveloped'_ and how. In the 1950s and 1960s, it basically took the form of economic assistance, infrastructure planning and development, to Third world. Whereas integrated rural development and basic needs prevailed in the 1970s, in the 1980s it talked about structural adjustment and loan conditions and in the 1990s till now issues like human development, human rights, gender issues, environmental concerns, the role of the NGOs in modernization, democratization, women empowerment have prevailed.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Since this paper combines between translation theories and mass communication, the review of literature is divided into two parts: the first investigates ideological translation studies, while the other tackles communication for development theories.

A-Translation studies

The debate 'literal' or word-for-word translation vs. 'free' or sense-for-sense translation continued for almost 2000 years since Cicero (1st century B.C.). In 1952, Nida referred for the first time in the literature to a 'science' of translation

in 'Toward a Science of Translation'. Since then and for four decades translation studies were literary and linguistic. In the 1990s translation theories moved away from the static linguistic perspective towards a culture and ideology-oriented research, a move called the cultural "turn" as Mary Snell-Hornby (1990) termed. Bassnett and Lefevere's *Translation, History and Culture* was an important work at the beginning of that decade; they argued that there is an obvious interaction between translation and culture, therefore culture impacts and constraints translation (1990:11). Gentzler argues boundaries and interdisciplinary investigations in translation studies need to be reassessed, a matter useful to Western and non-Western scholars and:

The future of translation studies will no doubt involve an increase in scholarship on postcolonial cultures, a trend that has already started...These explorations are among the most exciting for the field and will have an enormous impact upon future studies. (2001:195)

Munday (2008:125) discusses three major trends of translation studies in this connection: translation as rewriting, translation and feminist studies and translation and post-colonialism. As for translation and rewriting, in his book *Translation, Rewriting and the Manipulation of Literary Fame* (1992), Lefevere identifies 'very concrete factors' which affect the reception of literary texts, i.e. 'issues such as power, ideology institution and manipulation' (1992:2). The literary system, in his opinion, is governed by three factors. First, the 'professionals' within the literary system (like critics and reviewers) decide upon the poetics and sometimes the ideology of the translated texts. Second,

the 'patronage' outside the literary system (persons or institutions) can influence the reading, writing and rewriting of literature; this includes three components, the ideological, the economic and the status. Again 'ideological' here refers to the choice of the subject and its presentation. Third, the 'dominant poetics' refers to the literary devices and the concept of the literature role (Munday 2008:126-7). He assumes that:

On every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological and/or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out. (1992:39)

In this context, translating is a rewriting process before and during which ideological pressures are exercised and the translated texts are "to no small extent indicative of the dominant ideology at a certain time in a certain society" (1992:42). Most ideological translation studies in the last few years concentrate on rewriting and literature, for example Li's 'Proust and China: Translation, ideology and contemporary intertextual practice' (2014), Du and Zhang's 'Rewriting, ideology, and poetics in Goldblatt's Translation of Mo Yan's (The Garlic Ballads)' (2015), and Sergi's 'Converging ideologies in William Fowler's hybrid translation of Machiavelli's *II Principe*' (2014a).

The second trend in translation and ideological and cultural research focusses on gender studies. Simon (1996:1) criticizes using the term 'culture' in translation studies in a vague, unspecific way and introduces the theme of gender and feminists to translation. Dominance, faithfulness, fidelity and

betrayal images prevail in such theories. She makes a comparison between the status of women in society_ mostly oppressed by a man-dominant society_ and that of translation _ which comes at the bottom of the literary ladder. She argues:

For feminist translation, fidelity is to be directed toward neither the author nor the reader, but toward the writing project_ a project in which both writer and translator participate. (Simon 1996:2)

In this kind of translation, feminist translators ideologically manipulate every language strategy with a view to make the target text speak for women:

My translation practice is a political activity aimed at making language speak for women. So my signature on a translation means: this translation has used every translation strategy to make the feminine visible in language. (deLotbiniere-Harwood, cited in Simon 1996:15; Munday 2008: 132)

Barbara Godard, being a feminist translator herself, highlights the ideological manipulation of translation to reflect the feminist component: "The feminist translator, affirming her critical difference, her delight in interminable re-reading and re-writing, flaunts the signs of her manipulation of the text" (1990:91). In general, gender translation studies have flourished recently. Scholars like Sergi talks about 'Translation, power and gender in Thomas Hudson's *Historie of Judith*' (2014b).

The third, actually the most recent, trend in ideological and cultural translation studies is the post-colonial research. At the beginning of the 1990s

decade, translation studies was criticized for its Western orientation and the failings resulting as a consequence. Niranjana (1992:48-9) criticizes previous translation studies for the following reasons: a) Translation studies has not fully accounted for the power imbalance occurring between different languages; b) Most of the concepts underlying the Western theory are flawed (e.g. meaning, author and text); and c) Translation in the colonial context is based on a colonial domination over Western discourse.

Over the past decade, translation studies discussed issues related to translation and colonialism. Post-colonial translation theorists view translation as a tool that helped spread a positive image about the colonizer and colonization; in other words translation has disseminated 'an ideologically motivated image of colonized people' (Munday 2008: 132). Therefore Bassnett and Trivedi (1999:5) describe the history of translation as 'the shameful history of translation'. Generally speaking, post-colonial translators seek to use translation as a strategy of resistance to 'disturb' and displace the formalization of images of non-Western cultures instead of using traditional concepts of language and translation (Gentzler 2001:176). Although its scope is still undetermined, post-colonial studies cover topics like resistance to colonialism, the history of colonies and European empires and the impacts of the imbalance of power relations between the colonizer and the colonized people (Munday 2008:130).

Lefevere and Bassnett (1998) raise very enlightening questions on the ideology governing translation: Why are some texts translated and others are

not? What is the agenda behind such translations? How do the patrons controlling those agendas use and manipulate translators? Can we predict how translation is going to function in a given culture or society? In an attempt to answer these questions, they define translation as a cultural interaction and propose new critical tools for analysis. Also Niranjana's contributions in this regard are paramount, but for research theoretical and organizational reasons, her ideas are discussed in detail later in the theoretical framework of the paper.

The role of translation in Western imperialism is approached by Samia Mehrez (1992). Scholars like Haroldo and Augusto de Campos suggest a non-European perspective to translation and argue that translation is a form of transgression; they use concepts in a new way, e.g. 'cannibalism' is a sacred practice of symbolically taking out of love, contrary to the stereotype Western point of view (Gentzler 2001:197). Barbara Godard (1990) investigates the double colonization of Quebec women, meanwhile Vincent Rafael (1988) discusses how translation choices ensure or evade social order. Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002) consider translation as a metonymic activity where translators pick certain elements, literary or ideological, to stress rather than others and thus the partisan nature of this activity is highlighted. In Dingwaney and Maier's *Between Languages and Cultures* (1995)_ including the contributions of Egyptian theorists_ Third World texts are brought across by doing the minimal violence and pedagogy in order to record 'difference' instead of sacrificing it. The poetics of 'superior' language of the English colonizer in the Americas is studied in Cheyfitz's *The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and*

Colonization from the *Tempest* to *Tarzan* (1997); he shows that the colonized ironically used the colonizer's language to resist the latter's troops. The concept of 'power' is central to translation studies: for example Venuti (1992) writes about *Rethinking Translation: Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology*, von Flotow (2000) about *Translation and Ideology*, Genzler and Tymoczko (2002) *Translation as Power*, and Munday (2007) *Translation and Ideology: Encounters and Clashes*. Also, linguistic models include the works of Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997), Fairclough (2001, 2003), Munday (2007) and Baker (2006).

Kate Sturge (2004) discusses the ideology behind choosing specific texts in Nazi Germany to be translated, and how reviews in the governmental press support the racist policy of eliminating 'all the elements alien to the German character' thought to characterize foreign literature. Karen Bennett (2006, 2007) talks about the 'epistemicide' resulting from the dominance of English academic writing style that eliminates to a great extent the more traditional Portuguese writing. To be accepted in the international academic arena, she argues, one should conform to the English writing rules and style and the ways ideas are expressed in English, i.e. to think like the English. Keuris (2011) shows how the playwright Fugard's plays are affected by the recent Africans' translations. Corpus-based ideological translation studies is a topic presented by Defeng, Zhang and Liu (2011) through the analysis of two English translations of Honglougeng, a novelist. Jeanne Garane (2014) studies how the post-colonial translation theory has influenced the Francophone African

studies. Angelis (2014) examines the ideological translation of Dr Suess Goes to Japan and how translation presents him as an American icon.

B- Communication for Development

The concept of communication for development and modernization started to appear in the literature After World War II. The discourse of modernization implied what the Third World countries should be doing in order to be termed 'modernized' or 'developed'- instead of being 'underdeveloped'_ and how. Lerner (1958) indicates that the major idea of the early theories of mass media and modernization was essentially 'Westernization'; but it could not be so explicitly and bluntly termed, 'Westernization', because Third World leaders and peoples hated the West for political reasons. Thus this process was called 'modernization' and 'development' instead. In the period from the 1950s through the 1960s, modernization basically took the form of economic assistance, infrastructure planning and development, to Third world. Whereas integrated rural development and basic needs prevailed in the 1970s. The 1980s was the decade of structural adjustment and loan conditions. The main focus of the 1990s to the present time is on issues like human development, human rights, gender issues, environmental concerns, the role of the NGOs in modernization, democratization, women empowerment, among others.

The earliest communication models in the 1950s and 60s looked at communication as a linear process which consists of a message, a message sender and receiver, a channel through which the message is sent, and a feedback. Since they inform and consequently influence, they enjoy a kind of

power. Studies of voting processes in the 1950s revealed that mass media transmitted information about decisions to key opinion leaders and from them to others through the social system (Rogers 1962). The Diffusion Model is based on the assumption a mixture of both mass media and interpersonal communication and a diffusion of information to mass media receivers, and particularly to peasants, would lead them to be aware of and adopt the new technologies and innovations propagated and consequently develop (Melkote and Steeves 2008: 56). Colle (1989) criticizes this model for its overemphasis on adoption and underestimating the recipient factor; the Model finally failed.

A new Pro-persuasion Model of development was extended. It suggests that development can be attained if peasants are regarded rational enough to see the value and importance of adopting the innovations selected for them. But they were, according to the model, incapable of choosing from the array of alternatives beforehand. Although mass media was proved useful in increasing the peasants' level of awareness, the model failed because face-to-face communication was thought to be more effective at that time and mass media could reach only a few number people (Melkote and Steeves 2008:57). Colle (1989:64) postulates that if the material was boring and diffused at times inappropriate for receivers, mass media (radio) would become an ineffective tool.

Then some communication models based on pro-literacy concepts started to appear. The transistorized radio (cheap, portable and battery-operated) emerged in the late 1950s and aimed to reach larger numbers and spread 'modernism'

values like literacy, urbanization (referring to industrialization), democratic participation, etc. Yet, this model was definitely flawed since it could not achieve the aspired goals in the Third World countries. At this point, the West theorists refused to admit failure in the model itself and attributed it to 'in-the-head psychological constraints' within the 'laggards' (referring to receivers in these countries) like familism, fatalism, religiosity, lack of deferred gratification, etc. (Rogers 1962). So they developed In-the-head Psychological Constraints Model. Then, Ascroft (1973; in Melkote and Steeves 2008:61) managed to identify other non-psychological factors leading to the non-adoption of innovations and hence development of farmers: lack of knowledge and skills about innovations to be adopted; lack of people involvement in the development planning process; lack of financial and material inputs necessary for adoption; inadequate market development for sale/purchase of produce; lack of infrastructure to facilitate the distribution of information and materials; and lack of off-season employment opportunities in rural areas. While the first constraint can be said to be in the head, the other five are 'external'. Hence a new 'External Constraints' model was devised. This perspective allowed communication to be seen as a dynamic support communication which tried to bridge the gap between senders and receivers of information.

After the end of the Cold War in 1990, globalization revealed the strong relationship between communication for development on the one hand and politics, economics and ideology in societies on the other. At this point, we need to reconsider these theories, coming from the West values, ideas and

ideologies and ask ourselves: Does mass media really communicate for development and modernization or it promotes specific agendas? The answer to this question reflects the gap in the literature of mass communication theories and the paper would hopefully attract the attention to this gap through the analysis of texts.

Through this review of the literature, it appears that there is a gap in the literature of ideological translation studies which describe English/Arabic post-colonial translation and communication for development theories. Hopefully the present paper would fill in this gap by investigating the functional role of mass media in modernization and development, explaining how it can be dysfunctional as a political, war tool in international conflicts, criticizing the power of the dominant mass media and the one way flow of messages from the "developed" North to the "underdeveloped" South, discussing how some other media use mass media otherwise as a peaceful tool; and all these aims are pursued through a discussion of the roles of ideological translation. In addition, this analysis comes amidst the spread and dominance of academic English discourse in the literature, something that we should be concerned about (see J. House 2002 and Mary Snell-Hornby 2006).

From the previous review of literature, the researcher have been able to state the problem statement and devised from it the different hypotheses related to the study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Gentzler draws our attention to the array of interesting findings and conclusions that emerge from a multidisciplinary approach to translation:

to better analyse the variety meanings and functions produced...We are at the verge of an exciting new phase of research for the field, one that is forcing scholars to combine theories and resources from a variety of disciplines and which is leading to multiple new insights. (2001:203)

Hence, comes the importance of the present paper for implementing an approach derived from multi-theories and disciplines: from linguistic to ideological translation studies, from mass communication models to the politics of international relations, power and conflict theories. And here arises the challenge too.

In researching translation and ideology, Hatim (2001:126-7) explains, two perspectives can immediately jump into our minds: the 'translation of ideology', i.e. how ideology is translated and how best to perpetuate this in translation, and the 'ideology of translation'_ ideology entails a cover of what is going to be in or out of the translated text, i.e. what to translate and what to exclude. In addition, any kind of mediation on the side of the translator can be regarded as ideological in itself:

in the societal sense..(e.g. the translator mediates to express her own feminism or racism); in the translational sense.. (e.g. the translator mediates to uphold the mores of the translation tradition or ethos prevailing). (p.127)

A very important question in this context should be raised: why do we need to translate a certain text or part of text and exclude another_ a kind of mediation too? The answer would be made clear through the analysis of data.

In translating ideology, scholars examine the extent of the translator's mediation in 'sensitive texts'. Sensitive texts are those which try to persuade or convince readers, like political, religious, or legal texts. Mediation is defined as 'the extent to which translators intervene in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into processing the text' (Hatim and Mason 1997:147). Both the translator and the writer can mediate when drafting a text (Hatim and Munday 2004:103). Niranjana is one of the most influential scholars of ideological translation studies. She deems translation as the 'site' in which inequality of relations among the different cultures and languages has been caused. Therefore the traditional concepts of translation_ like faithfulness and loyalty_ need reconsideration; she calls them 'naïve' as Gentzler says:

The uncritical and often naïve adoption of traditional concepts of translation, i.e., translation as transparent, objective, and faithful, has enabled colonial politicians and administrators to construct the 'exotic' Other as eternal and unchanging. This image of the Other has not only had a dramatic impact upon the West's understanding of so-called 'Third World' cultures, but also upon many emerging nations' understanding of their own cultures. (2001:177)

The point is that presenting a certain positive image about the colonizer and a negative one about the colonized is actually an ideology and for good reasons it

affects both cultures in such a way that the identity of the colonized is shaped and reshaped accordingly_ the researcher does not assume that there is no other variables in this process of shaping nations' identities, yet the translation impact is huge enough for the research purposes. In this regard Gertzler adds:

Niranjana argues that translations cannot just be understood in terms of faithful/ free or source-text/ target-text models, but they should instead be viewed as a two-way flow, reciprocally reinforcing and/or transforming established notions of culture and identity.

In other words, one cannot approach translation anymore from the traditional perspective of faithfulness and loyalty, especially when describing the issue of power, which is central to the post-colonial theory. Niranjana discusses how translation into English has been manipulated by the colonial power to rewrite an image of the 'East' and make it stand for the truth. Her examples for the colonization imposition of certain ideological values on the colonized, and in fact on the colonizers themselves, include but not restricted to the reference to missionaries who ran schools for the latter and who played an important role as linguists and translators. She accuses those groups of "participating in the enormous project of collection and codification on which colonial power was based" (Niranjana 1992:34; Munday 2001:134). Therefore the translator, Niranjana insists, must resist the colonization discourse.

The politics or poetics of translation, as it were, in the West, since translation studies are basically Western-oriented, tends to find normative solutions accepted by the Western people, regardless of the other receivers from other

cultures and languages. Niranjana gives the example of Indian translators who are educated in the West and who apply translation strategies without giving proper attention to the traditions and forms of the source culture or to their source identity (Gentzler 2001:181). Although Douglas Robinson (1997) criticizes Niranjana's strategies as confusing to the practical translator and Dharwadker (1999) suggests she manipulated the evidence (using a specific version of the sample text rather than another), and though many Indian scholars of translation do not like her for her harsh criticism of them, yet her theory clearly manifests the interdisciplinary intersection between translation and other disciplines such as history, philosophy, and culture.

Spivak takes Niranjana's ideas one step ahead suggesting that the translator's position come as a mediator who should know the history of the language, of the author's moment and of the language-in-translation because translation is not just a matter of fluent language and the translator must grasp the source text time, place and traditions and render these elements in his target texts (1993:186). Moreover, the task of the translator, in her point of view, is not to re-describe and then re-inscribe power relations, instead it is to measure the differences in given cultures in given situations (Gentzler 2001:185).

However, approaching translation from an ideological perspective is problematic because the researcher can be easily criticized for adopting a certain ideology herself. Munday criticizes these studies for adopting the scholars' ideologies and agendas:

.. it is important to remember that cultural theorists (indeed, it could be said, any theorists) themselves have their own ideologies and agendas that drive their own criticism. (2008:134)

Furthermore, possible pitfalls for researching ideology are distortions, determinism or too powerful generalizations (124-25). For this reason, a multidisciplinary approach would be employed in the paper so that the analysis should be balanced, taken from various and different angles.

Concepts from the communication for development theory as presented in the U.S. and West literature are used here, where 'development' means modernization, critical perspective, liberation (from oppression), basic needs, sustainable development and women and development, democratization, etc. (Melkote and Leslie 2008:34-5). Mass media, according to Calsamiglia and Van Dijk (2004:370; cited in Sobrino 2013:236), has a paramount role in the re-contextualization and re-creation of specialized knowledge (i.e. the discourse on international affairs) into the everyday language and knowledge of non-specialized audience; in so doing the media attempts to fill in the gap between the former and the latter (Van Dijk 2005:88). The analysis would be supplemented by terms and concepts borrowed from pragmatics, the theory of power and political conflict theory. Power politics is a form of international relations in which sovereign states protect their interests by threatening one another with military, economic or political aggression (Mearsheimer 2001). Al-Sorour and Al-Alusi (2012) assure that competition over news channels is a main element in political conflicts.

METHODOLOGY

As mentioned before, this study aimed to investigate the functional and dysfunctional roles of ideological translation and mass media in the Arab World and challenges some concepts of translation and of mass communication. It hypothesized that both translation and mass communication can play a functional role promoting modernization and development or a dysfunctional one promoting chaos and conflict and that both have recently played a dysfunctional role in the Arab world. Based upon these hypotheses, the researcher was able to make the following research questions.

Research questions:

- What is the role played by the internationally-dominant mass media in the Arab World?
- How can the translation of ideology and the ideology of translation help negatively or positively mass media in reshaping the audience's awareness globally?

With the following subsidiary questions:

- How true is the U.S., or West, enterprise of modernization and development in the Arab World?
- How are international conflicts and crises managed to serve certain agendas?
- What is the relationship between power and mass media effects on message receivers?
- Is professionalism behind the dominance of certain media channels?

- Can the Arab mass media stand in the face of a North-South flow of communication?
- Is the global discourse of mass media articulated to create international chaos and conflicts or promote peace and modernization?

Methods of Collecting Data

The researcher designed the method for collecting data through a multi-disciplinary approach derived from ideological and pragmatic translation studies, mass communication models, and political theories. She used a dual methodology of a qualitative content and comparative analyses applied mainly to a selection of English/ Arabic texts gathered from Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJE) and AJE (as one of them translates from the other, i.e. they are the same agency but one writes in Arabic and the other in English) and from Al Arabiya channels. The samples are texts on the 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013 revolutions in Egypt. The data includes written texts taken from their official websites and excludes visual discourse, images, facial expressions, body language and the like for reasons of space and unity of analysis. These are sensitive political texts since they try to persuade or convince receivers. In fact the researcher has found a huge number of data and texts suitable for the analysis, which would have been quite laborious to describe. Therefore she selected a few, noticing that the same idea is often repeated in the texts. With this in mind, the paper is divided into sections to provide some preliminary concepts; to review the literature; to demonstrate the theoretical and

methodological framework; to analyse and discuss sample texts (English and Arabic); and finally to present the conclusion and recommendations.

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) was incepted in 1994. While Al-Jazeera English channel (AJE) was first broadcasted in 2006 and its viewership reached 110 million households in less than two years. Nigel Parsons, a AJE managing director states that the aim was to 'revolutionize' the viewers' choices and to set out different news 'agendas' (Al-Najjar 2009:1-2). Some facts about AJE, Al-Najjar (2009:6-8) says, should be kept into consideration before starting the analysis. First, the AJE staff and management come from 50 nationalities, most journalists from the CNN, BBC and CBC carrying with them Western ideological settings that are thought to influence news productions at the channel. Second, an American news sense is quite evident in world conflicts. Third, international news channels are criticized for their ethnocentrism, especially when dealing with the Third World issues.

Al-Jazeera has raised so much controversy. Some construed its coverage of the 'uprisings' or the 'revolutions' in the Arab World as involvement rather than objective news coverage, criticized of being subjective and unprofessional (Gornall 2011; cited in Galandar 2013:2). Others, mostly Western-oriented, praised it as an advocate of democratic, liberal political values. In a significant comparison between AJA and AJE, Fattah argues:

In effect, Al-Jazeera International intends to become for the developing world what Al-Jazeera became to the Arab World: a champion of forgotten causes, a news organization willing to take the contrarian view and risk being controversial. (2006)

Nasr (2014:398) argues that Al-Jazeera not only took the stance of rebels in Egypt but also focused on its role as an agent in the 'uprising'. It manipulated both words and images to the extent of embedding its news anchors, correspondents and cameramen among assumed freedom and democracy fighters (p.410). Al-Jazeera set itself from the beginning as an advocate of the U.S. ideology and agenda. Powerful groups in the field of mass communication use certain strategies to reinforce their messages and ideologies_ of course side by side with the traditional norms and conventions of media practice (Melkote and Leslie 2008:32). These strategies, among others, provide a basic categorization for the following sections in the analysis.

Overemphasizing certain ideas and ideologies

Ideology, implying the translator's or the one imposed on him by patronage, controls the translation strategy and the way he solves certain problems. In this context, translating is a rewriting process before and during which ideological pressures are exercised and the translated texts are 'to no small extent indicative of the dominant ideology at a certain time in a certain society' (Lefevere 1992:42). AJE language reflects a selected ideology and so does AJA of course. Since one of them is a translation of the other, they speak the same ideology. Due to the emerging realization of the horrifying effects of mass media on receivers, international actors have deliberately used it to dominate

mass media. It is a very fertile setting for conflicts. And so long as power is at the hand of the United States and the West, the argument goes in favour of their hegemony over such a powerful tool to manage international conflicts. Consequently messages flow from the North to the South.

Conflict as a social phenomenon of competition between actors with incompatible goals is as old as human civilization. According to the Neo-realism conflict theory in political sciences: a) States are key actors and determine the rules of the game; b) Inter-state relations are based on selfish human nature; and c) States put national interests first and seek to realize them through maximizing power (Wolff 2015:1,9). This is clear in the US diligent attempts to impose its ideology on the Third World countries. Condoleezza Rice, a U.S. Secretary of State, announced her theory of 'constructive chaos' in 2005 and the States has been promoting for this ideology. The Arab Spring revolutions are a step in this direction. Therefore, Al-Jazeera (AJA and AJE), an advocate of this ideology, describes the events happening in Egypt in January and February 2011 as 'making history':

[1] Through interviews with correspondents on the ground, Al-Jazeera tells the story of 18 days when **history was made**. (Egypt Burning, 24 Feb.2011)

According to Al-Jazeera ideology, the January 2011 revolution is 'making history' while the June 2013 one is a 'military coup' and Morsi is 'the legitimate president', despite the 30 million people who went into the streets to oust Morsi and ask Al-Sisi to take over:

[2] Who is the **terrorist**? Violence and power in Egypt after Morsi.

Despite the July coup, the military's position is not as strong as it seems given Egypt's weak economy...

Amid all the rhetoric about Islamic terrorism, few seem to realize that **most of the terrorizing has in fact come from the state...**

Today **it seems as if Egypt has returned to the Mubarak era, with repression, propaganda and state-sponsored violence at even higher levels than before January 25, 2011.** (Who is the Terrorist, 22 Aug. 2013)

AJE refers to Al-Sisi as the 'terrorist' and makes a comparison between the Mubarak rule and the expected regime under the presidency of Al-Sisi. Of course, it argues, the former was better and the people should expect horrors today. The latter is just a replacement for Mubarak against whom people revolted. In addition, what is more important to AJE and AJA_ the plan_ is 'the downfall ' of the 'military government' and 'the entire system':

[3] Only the wholesale transformation of the country's political economy, which no one but the revolutionaries has any interest in bringing about, can achieve that. Egyptians have already known this, which is why the January 25 Revolution demanded not merely Mubarak' replacement, but the **downfall of the military government and the entire system.** (Who is the Terrorist, 22 Aug. 2013)

The comparison is very significant here. It provokes the imagination and feelings of Egyptians so that they have to revolt against the de facto situation which does not meet the necessary requirements for change in the region as delineated by the States.

The technique, regardless of any professionalism claims, focuses on quoting the opinions and ideologies of those who support the U.S. agenda meanwhile the contrary view is underestimated and mocked at (will be discussed in the next section). Most news about the June revolution_ presented as a 'coup' _ contain references of the kind:

[4]"We will remain steadfast on the road to defeating **the military coup**", a pro-Morsi alliance called the National Coalition to Support **Legitimacy** and Reject the **Coup** said in a statement. (Egypt's Anti-coup Alliance, 23 Aug. 2013)

So, since Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood man, was ousted and this 'Spring' agenda foiled in 2013, Al-Jazeera has been trying to awaken the project again:

[5] Just three years ago, the **Arab Spring** bloomed across North Africa and the Middle East. Then the powers that had backed the old regimes, the military, the intelligence services, and the wealthy, struck back. In short order, the **counter-revolutions** particularly swept the table.

At the same time, new waves of radical violence were unleashed_ perhaps opportunistically or perhaps deliberately_ in order to create conditions that would justify a renewal of the so called '**War on Terror**'. (What Future, 5 July 2014)

Al-Jazeera terrifies people of the war on terror in a clear reference to the idea that Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular should not believe in the regime's fight against ISIS or terror because it is no more than a cover to hide the true face of authoritarianism.

Niranjana (1992) proposes that if we consider translation in terms of being a faithful medium transferring something static, then it definitely promotes the colonial hegemonic enterprise in, for instance, the Third World. This is what AJA and AJE do_ no matter which one of them presents the translation of the other for both are faces of the same coin. Promoted via translations, these negative messages affect the receivers who then consciously or unconsciously use the same language and ideology. This explains the amount of deception befallen most Egyptians particularly in 2011 and 2012. Indeed the analysis of texts would reveal important findings in this regard.

Underestimating certain ideologies or attitudes and their supporters:

AJE underestimates the opposite ideology. The U.S. agenda seeks to destroy Egypt's army _no army means no defense. It does not, by virtue, call it 'the army', instead 'the military', a term that agitates the Egyptians' hatred for its own protector and reminds them of the British occupation. In this quotation AJE reviews the opposite opinion, and then underestimates it:

[6]**The military**, so revered by the Egyptian people, defined itself as **a safeguard of the revolution**; it became quite normal to hear Egyptians talk of how the military and the people were of "one hand".

However, this narrative clashed with **reality**: The military started making arrests during the uprising, with 12000 people tried in military courts since February, at a conviction rate of 93 per cent; while soldiers **forced virginity tests upon female activists** detained in a backroom of the Egyptian museum and activists critical of the military were committed to mental institution. (Egypt Burning, 24 Feb.2011)

AJA even mocks at the army and calls it 'a safeguard' of the revolution. Note the connection made here between the target (in this case the military) and some taboo or sensitive issues for Egyptians ('virginity tests'). It introduces its opinion or ideology as 'reality' implying that the other point of view is undoubtedly a lie. Therefore, anyone with an alternative view is definitely undercounted. For instance AJA tackles the issue of dispersing Rabaa sit-in (on 14 August 2013) as if it were a massacre committed by the Egyptian security forces. In Hadith Al-Madina (Talk of the Town) (21 Aug. 2013) programme, the protesters' point of view_ same ideology adopted by Al-Jazeera_ was discussed side by side with the contrary view. Let's see the promoted ideology through the programme presenter's and the first guest's statements:

عثمان أي فرح (TV presenter): السلام عليكم ورحمة الله أهلاً بكم إلى حديث الثورة، بعد أسبوع على فض قوات [7] الأمن المصرية لاعتصام رافضي الانقلاب العسكري في رابعة العدوية والذي أسفر عن مقتل المئات نحاول اليوم إعادة تركيب مشهد عملية الفض التي لاقت تلميحات دولية وإدانات من منظمات حقوقية بلغت حد وصفها بأكبر عملية قتل جماعي في تاريخ مصر الحديث.

إبراهيم الديب (representing AJA ideology): بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، أخي ما رأيته يعني لا يمثل عشرة في المئة من الحقيقة يحكي بعض التفاصيل الجزئية، حضرتك محتاجين أنا حضرت قبل كده مشروع حرب في القوات المسلحة أنا كنت ضابط في الجيش المصري اللي أنا شفته هذا مشروع حرب متكامل تم تنفيذه على مستوى عالي جداً من الحرفية العسكرية النوعية.

Then contrary view is raised:

عصام عبد الله (representing the contrary view): أقول لك أولاً اعتصام رابعة واعتصام النهضة [8]

كان من أجل سبب سياسي وكان معهم أسلحة من كل نوع ومن كل شكل داخل هذا لاعتصام ولم يصورها التقرير ولم يصورها الفيلم، الأمر الثاني أنه حصلت مفاوضات سياسية من أجل فض الاعتصام سلميا وفشلت المفاوضات السياسية من قبل قادة جماعة الإخوان المسلمين ولك أن تعلم أنه ولا واحد من هؤلاء القادة وجد في الميدان بل جميعهم هربوا اليوم يتساقطون بعد أن تركوا الغلابة يلاقوا مصيرهم ويموتون وهم الآن يحلقون اللحي ويصبغونها ويهربون.

According to this perspective, the sit-in was virtually political; protesters had weapons of all kinds; Al-Jazeera did not film this; Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders refused negotiations and escaped from the square leaving the second raw supporters alone to face their destiny. This argument, thus, refutes the first point of view altogether. Hence come some comments in order to underestimate the contrary view:

إبراهيم الديب (representing AJA ideology): هناك فارق كبير، سوف أجيبك عليها، هناك فارق كبير بين [9] من كان موجود وكان عايش وأصيب، أنا أصبت يوم الجمعة كنت موجود يوم الأربعاء لحد الساعة السادسة مساء من الصباح لحد الساعة مساء، هناك فارق كبير أنا كنت موجود وأبنائي الاثنين معي وفقدتهم وجدتهم آخر الليل، وفارق ما بين من يشاهد مشاهد بعض المشاهد على التلفاز ويطلق كلاما مرسلا يعني ويحاول أن يوثق هذا الكلام بموثيق دولية.

عثمان آي فرح (TV presenter): أخشى أن يقال أن أصابتك وهمية أيضا.

Both the TV presenter and the first guest attack the Other. In fact the AJA argument is too weak to convince any equitable, well-aware audience, but the presenter kept on attacking Essam Abdallah, the Other guest:

عصام عبد الله: أولا ثم لماذا لم تذكر الضباط الذين ذبحوا في كرداسة وفي حلوان؟ ولماذا لم تذكر الجنود الذين [10] قتلوا للمرة الثانية في رفح؟ .. اتق الله يا أخي في المصريين يا أخي، هذه دولتك أنت مصري يا أخي أنت لست تنتمي إلى جماعة أنت تنتمي إلى مصر..

عثمان آي فرح :لو سمحت هذه الأسئلة سوف أوجهها له أرجو أن تجيبني على سؤالي فأرجو أنت تحبيني على سؤالي، ما نتائج هذه التحقيقات؟ ... من إذن الذي قتل كل هؤلاء في المنصة ورابعة والنهضة ورمسيس من؟

عصام عبد الله :هناك شهود وإثباتات وأدلة وهناك كاميرات وهناك تسجيلات يا سيدي الفاضل الكلام المرسل أنك تجب لي واحد باعتباره شاهد وهو لم يشهد أي شيء أنك تمليه ماذا يقول، لكن حين يكون بالصوت والصورة....

عثمان آي فرح :بهدهو لو سمحت، وهل من ضمن أدلة البراءة التي أنت يبدو لم تشاهدها القناصون على أسطح المنازل والرصاص الذي كان يطلق على الأبرياء هل هذا من ضمن، مهلا..

عصام عبد الله :ومن الذي قال لحضرتك أن القناصين دول ما كنوش .. من حماس ومن سوريا ومن العراق ومن الجيش الحر..

عثمان آي فرح :اسمح لي لو سمحت كل الشرطة والجيش الذين كانوا يطوقوا المكان لم يقبضوا على هؤلاء ثم نقطة أخرى..

عصام عبد الله :قبضوا عليهم بالفعل واعترفوا لعلم حضرتك الخاص الذي أرشد عن المرشد العام للإخوان المسلمين فلسطيني..

Where is the TV presenter's answer to the guest question, 'Why don't you mention the officers slaughtered in Kerdasa and Helwan?' Nothing, just ignoring the question and moving quickly to another to distract the attention of the audience from this point:

[11] **عصام عبد الله** :يا سيدي أذيعوا الحقائق..

عثمان آي فرح :اسمعي أنت موجود هنا لو سمحت بدل أن تهاجمنا نرجو أن تستغل الفرصة لتقول أنت الحقائق التي تراها..

عصام عبد الله :بالعكس أنا شكرتك..

عثمان آي فرح :طيب شكرا على شكرك بس استمع إلى لو سمحت يعني أنت تقول أن هناك تحقيقات وشهادات وإفادات وبالتالي حدثت تحقيقات ولكن نحن ننتظر كل ذلك رغم كل الأحداث وكل القتلى كيف إذن ..اسمح لي.

عصام عبد الله :طيب ولماذا كل هذا وأنت تذيع هذا الفيلم، لماذا تذيع هذا الفيلم ولم تنتظر التحقيقات!؟

عثمان آي فرح :اسمح لي أن أكمل هذا السؤال، ولماذا لم يتم انتظار التحقيقات والإفادات قبل القبض على مئات من الإخوان المسلمين وأنصارهم؟ لماذا لم يتم انتظار التحقيقات والإفادات وحدث هذا بهذه السرعة يعني قبض على المئات في مسجد الفتح على سبيل المثال ولم يتم انتظار التحقيقات، كيف يدعم هذا مصداقية ما تقول؟

عصام عبد الله :لأنهم استخدموا قوة السلاح، لأنهم استخدموا قوة السلاح، ومن ضبط معهم من جميع الجنسيات العربية بل والأجنبية وسوقوا الآن إلى التحقيقات ولماذا تأخذ قناة الجزيرة هذا الموقف الموالي للإخوان المسلمين ولا تنتظر التحقيقات أيضا لماذا؟

عثمان آي فرح :أي موالي نحن لم نتخذ أي موقف!؟

This example reflects the fact that most of the new theories of communication stress the role and power of mass media in, for instance: influencing public opinion, setting agendas for public discourse, persuading and educating through planned campaigns, presenting role models for both children and adults to imitate, offering gratifications for audience needs, cultivating the audience's perception of society (Melkote and Steeves 2008:31) and changing societies and shaping their awareness.

Fabricating events and twisting facts

The role of mass media is no more a process of information transmission. Taken into its right framework of new information technologies and development, mass media has become a horrifyingly powerful tool utilized to deliver information, persuade, educate, socialize, satisfy audience needs, set agendas, and democratize societies (Melkote and Steeves 2008: 31). Among the issues that escalated tension in the January revolution was the lie_ no evidence

provided but the Guardian newspaper' report_ spread immediately all over the world that Mubarak's wealth is 70 milliard dollars, i.e. bigger even than the Bill Gates' (54 milliard), the world's number one richest man. Egyptian demonstrators went as far as starting to calculate and divide this fortune and imagine what each Egyptian would do with his newly acquired wealth of one million dollars.

ذكرت صحيفة غارديان البريطانية أن ثروة الرئيس المصري حسني مبارك وعائلته تتراوح بين 40 و70 مليار [12] دولار، وفقاً لتحليل خبراء في الشرق الأوسط. وأوضحت أن هذه الثروة موزعة ما بين أرصدة في بنوك سويسرية وبريطانية، وعقارات في بريطانيا والولايات المتحدة الأميركية ومصر.. معظمها تم إخراجها من البلاد ووضعها في حسابات سرية ببنوك سويسرية وبريطانية، مثل بنك يو بي أس السويسري وبنك أسكتلندا،

(The Guardian 5 Feb 2011)"

Then Al-Jazeera then describes in details the wealth of Gamal Mubarak (Mubarak's son) _ a figure so much hated by Egyptians at that time_ and the rest of the family:

-تؤكد مصادر الصحيفة أن جمال مبارك.. يملك وحده "ثروة تقدر ب 17 مليار دولار موزعة على عدة [13] مؤسسات مصرفية سويسرا وألمانيا والولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا. "ووفق المصادر فإن "جمال يملك حسابا جاريا سريا في كل من بنك يو بي أس وأي سي أم وتوزع ثروته عبر صناديق استثمارية عديدة في الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا منها مؤسسة بريستول آند ويست العقارية البريطانية، ومؤسسة فايننشال داتا سيرفس، التي تدير صناديق الاستثمار المشترك."

-أما السيدة سوزان مبارك فتقول الصحيفة نقلا عن "تقرير سري تداولته جهات أجنبية عليا" إن سوزان دخلت نادي المليارديرات منذ العام 2000، "وتتراوح ثروتها بين 3 و5 مليارات دولار معظمها في بنوك أميركية، إلى جانب عقارات في عدة عواصم أوروبية مثل لندن وفرانكفورت ومدريد وباريس ودبي."

-وتشير الصحيفة إلى أن قيمة ممتلكات علاء مبارك وأمواله الشخصية داخل وخارج مصر تقدر بنحو 8 مليارات

دولار.. (The Guardian 5 Feb 2011).

Because most ordinary, naïve people in Egypt thought that numbers speak louder than the content itself, they fell into the trap to the extent that they started to calculate their shares in this wealth.

Indeed, most of Al-Jazeera coverings regarding the revolutions in the Arab countries generally and Egypt particularly are fabricated and facts are twisted. For instance it overemphasized the number of Brotherhood protesters and hid their violence. It describes the sit-in disperse as 'the biggest operation of collective killing in modern history in Egypt':

نحاول اليوم إعادة تركيب مشهد عملية الفض التي لاقت تنديدات دولية وإدانات من منظمات حقوقية بلغت [14] حد وصفها بأكبر عملية قتل جماعي في تاريخ مصر الحديث. (Dadith Al-Thawra, 21 Aug.2013)

When other media broadcasted the true numbers of protesters, Al-Jazeera attributed failure of mobilizing huge numbers to a very funny reason, the arrest of its leaders:

[15] In recent days, Brotherhood protests that once attracted tens of thousands of people at locations across the country have ebbed, suggesting the group's famed organizational strength may have been damaged by the arrest of its leaders. (Egypt's Anti-coup Alliance 23 Aug. 2013)

Here, one cannot evade an inevitable question: Were Brotherhood protests huge in number or they ebbed? In other words, this is a clear contradiction in the content presented. Whenever it needs to ignite revolt, it creates a lie. On 23 August 201 Al-Jazeera announced that Mubarak was released from prison to

aggravate the Egyptians' feelings and push them towards protesting against Al-Sisi rule. All proved to be a lie later, but until then a lot can happen in their mobilization:

[16] Egypt's anti-coup alliance plans protests. Muslim Brotherhood and other groups call for protests dubbed "Friday of Martyrs", as ex-leader Mubarak freed from jail. His release has been met with indifference for **many** Egyptians, who are more focused on the country's **recent political crisis** (referring to June revolution) and last week's **massacre** of supporters of deposed President Morsi. (Egypt's anti-coup alliance 23 Aug. 2013)

To further provoke the Egyptians, Al-Jazeera used again the word 'massacre'. Note the use of 'many' to attach legitimacy to the lie statement, as if Al-Jazeera spoke on behalf of them. Whenever the police is trying to protect civilians and prevent the armed supporters of Morsi from performing acts against the state and its institutions, setting fires, looting, killing civilians, army men and policemen, etc., Al-Jazeera considers this a 'massacre' against freedom advocates. Let alone the true numbers of the victims from each side.

Focusing on events rather than content

As early as November 2011, if a church is attacked, no matter by whom or why, or if a Christian is involved in a fight, the matter was introduced as a sectarian war:

[17] **Sectarian violence** reared its ugly head in Cairo's Imbaba District and in the village of Sol, south of Cairo. The demolition of, and attacks on, churches continued. (Egypt: 'The People want', 8 Nov. 2011)

The Arab World had not heard of 'sectarian' wars before the Iranian revolution, when Iran started to implant its Shiite people in the Arab counties. Since then the topic 'sectarian wars' has come to the surface as an effective way to divide the Arabs, though the Arabs themselves don't have such sectarian trends. Who else would benefit from a divided Arab World than those with imperial aspirations and some conspirators? The United States sees itself as a sole great power in the world and appointed itself a policeman. The Israelis talk explicitly about their state extending from the ocean to the Gulf. Iran wants to restore the Persian Empire. Turkey aspires to get the Ottoman Empire back. Each of the international actors has its own interests, but many agree on dividing the Arab World.

Sometimes the details or content of such news is not provided. A 24-year-old chap died in prison. Savage details are provided so that the audience would be paralyzed to hear this and be left to their imagination to guess the rest:

[18] On October 27, 24-year-old Essam Atta died in a maximum security prison after guards allegedly turned hoses on and shoved them into his anus and mouth. (Egypt Burning, 24 Feb.2011)

One may wonder about the use of the word 'allegedly' here, particularly only 11 days after his death and no investigation results had been announced yet. The

text words are carefully chosen to serve specific intentions, this means the translator intervenes to convey a message that supports some ideology. Munday (2007:xiii) says interpreting and negotiating meaning are a kind of mediation or intervention because every and each conscious or unconscious choice represents an obvious case of intervention on the side of the translator.

Focusing on conflicts rather than consensus

Since its inception in 1994 (and later AJE's in 2006), Al-Jazeera has managed to attract many viewers because of its shocking arguments. Its talk shows, though 'too argumentative', reflect something that the Arabs had never been used to for decades on their Arabic TV stations, which had basically served as 'a public relations outlet for governments' (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002:11). The programmes Al-Eteghah Al-Moakes (The Contrary Direction) on AJA and The Stream on AJE are good examples in this regard. In the episode of 'The Arab Peoples Revolution' on 28 February 2011, Faysal Al-Qasem, the presenter, interviews two guests with opposite opinions about the Arab revolutions. He interviews two guests, Mohamed Al-Khodary, representing a counter- ideology to al-Jazeera, and Abel-Halim Qandeel, the pro-ideology.

فيصل القاسم: أهلا بكم .. هل تعتقد أن الثورات العربية سستمر 91,6% نعم، 8,4% لا. محمد الخصري [19]
لو بدأت معك، الكثير من الناس يطلبون منك أن تعتذر وأن تخجل على نفسك لأنك هنا وفي هذا البرنامج لعشرات
المرات وصفت الشعوب العربية بالقطعان المسيرة وفي آخر حلقة اعتذرت من القطعان لأن لديهم كرامة أكثر من
الشعوب العربية، ها هي الشعوب العربية كالأبطال كالوسائل تزلزل الأرض من تحت أقدام الجميع في اليمن في
الجزائر في كل الدول العربية، كيف ترد؟

محمد الخضري: بداية دعني أقل للذي يلومني على مواقفي "اللي اختشوا ماتو" بمناسبة الثورة المصرية. أنا هنا اليوم

وفي هذا البرنامج لقول كلمة حق لا يروق للمنافقين سماعها ويخشى الجبناء ..

فيصل القاسم (مقاطعا): ادخل مباشرة.

محمد الخضري: أقول إن أغلب الشعوب العربية قد فارقت الحياة وغادرت موانئ العزة والكرامة واستقرت في قاع

مراسي الذل والمهانة وأنا أعرف..

فيصل القاسم (مقاطعا): وصلت الفكرة وصلت الفكرة. تفضل كيف ترد؟

عبد الحلیم قنديل: يعني أولاً أنا بروح خالصة وليس بالروح المرتبكة للسيد الفاكهاني أريد أن أحيي الشهداء..

محمد الخضري (مقاطعا): احترم نفسك، احترم نفسك.

عبد الحلیم قنديل: أن أحيي الشهداء..أما بالنسبة لما قاله الأخ فهو غريب .. هذا الفهم مما ينطبق عليه قول .. "أعجمي

لا يقرأ

فيصل القاسم (مقاطعا): طيب كيف ترد على هذا الكلام؟ أعطاك أمثلة يعني.

Al-Qasem manipulates the interview in such a way that the two guests appear as if they were about to kill each other_ something like watching a football game and fans should see their team win; a matter Egyptians love so much. Guests don't mind using insults_ in other episodes they throw water and chairs into each other's face. The Arab viewers were not used to watching a controversy of this kind, that is why such programmes attracted millions of viewers in the Arab world and gathered them for the first time around one programme; Al-Jazeera broadcasts such scenes as examples for democracy and freedom of opinions. The topic and ideas offered a vivid material for them to discuss the next day.

Humanizing the event

Playing on the emotions of its audience, Al-Jazeera humanizes events by focusing on the people and what they do as humans. Look at how it describes Rabaa sit-in as if it were a fun day and a celebration event:

إبراهيم الديب: حضور النساء والأطفال إلى الميدان يؤكد سلمية المعتصمين وإصرارهم على السلمية، أنا [20] لما أكون رايح على الاعتصام واخذ زوجتي وأبنائي وأطفالي معي هل معنى ذلك لدي أي نية أن أعمل عنف؟ هذا تأكيد على السلمية، النقطة الأخرى أن الاعتصام طول فترة طويلة جدا فالناس سايبية بيوتها الناس بتحمل هم قضية .. فأخذ زوجتي وأولادي حتى أعمل حشد، النقطة الثانية كل الناس سايبية بيوتها جاءت قاعدة، عائلات كاملة جاية، وهذه العائلات قعدت أربعين يوم فحتى حضرتك شفت في بعض الفترات بدأ يتعمل بعض الترفيه للأطفال، فعاليات النساء تعملها دورات تدريبية، تعمل مسابقات للقرآن الكريم، كل هذا أوكد على ماذا يؤكد يا أخي على شيء أن لدينا قضية لدينا قضية مشروعة لدينا حق نبحت عنه. (Al-Eteghah Al-Moakes, 21 Feb.2011)

He claims that he went to the sit-in with his wife and children, i.e. no intention for violence. The image broadcasted is unreal. Protesters spent 40 days there, leaving their houses because they believed in their cause. They introduced fun days for children, training courses for women, and Holy Quran competitions. The viewer then starts to sympathize with the protesters and discard consequently any thoughts of their violence and terrorism.

When Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square sit-in was dispersed by Egyptian security forces on 14 August 2013, Al-Jazeera tried to promote the accident as a massacre and a hunt for journalists in order to mobilize the international public opinion against the Egyptian security forces and regime:

مراسلة صحفية: الاقتحام القوي بدأ بالفعل الطائرات تلقي القنابل المسيلة للدموع والمروحيات يوجد بها [21] قناصون يقومون تحديداً باصطياد كل من يحمل كاميرا أو يحاول تصوير هذه المذبحة يقومون باصطياده والتصويب كله على الرأس والرقبة...

تعليق صوتي: قتل كثير من المعتصمين المناهضين للانقلاب العسكري في ذلك اليوم لكن العدد النهائي للضحايا اختلف بين الروايات الرسمية التي تتحدث عن بضع مئات من القتلى وأخرى تحدثت عن أكثر من ألفي قتيل.

تعليق صوتي: لم يكن أمام المعتصمين سوى نقل المصابين وجثث الضحايا إلى مكان آخر، إلى مسجد الإيمان هنا بقيت الجثث حتى عصر اليوم التالي بانتظار تصاريح الدفن وسط محاولات أهالي القتلى الإبطاء من تحلل الجثث بسبب ارتفاع درجات الحرارة ومرور الساعات، أما أعداد المعتقلين فلا يمكن حصرها حتماً.. (Hadith Al-

Thawra, 21 August 2013)

How could the correspondent manage to count the number of victims ('more than two thousands') amidst the shooting and killing? One may wonder. According to her report anyone with a camera was hunted or shot in the head and neck. She humanizes the situation by showing the champion role of protesters while they move the injured and dead bodies away from the battlefield, as it were.

Selecting specific language and labels that support hegemonic agendas and the new reality:

Al-Jazeera plan was to spark and continue the revolution or more precisely the 'chaos'. AJE reports:

[22] The first episode of Egypt Burning tells the story of five days in January 2011 when the people of Egypt broke through a **barrier of fear** they had known for a generation.

People took to the streets across Egypt **demanding political freedoms, an end to state corruption and a better quality of life for the impoverished population.**

Anger had long been **brewing** in Egypt_ strikes, unemployment and sectarian tension were on the rise. (Egypt Burning, 24 Feb.2011)

It stresses that the 'great' people of Egypt were breaking the 'barrier of fear', a revealing imagery pushing them to go ahead otherwise they would be accused of cowardice. 'Freedom', 'corruption', 'better quality of life', 'impoverished population', 'anger' and 'brewing' enhance the same idea. Also, in order to destroy the judiciary in Egypt, Al-Jazeera has been deforming the image of judges, accusing them of injustice, and mocking at them:

[23] Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's **first-democratically-elected president**, has been charged with a seemingly **endless slate of crimes** since he was overthrown by the army on July 3. He is currently being held in Borg el-Arab prison in the northern city of Alexandria, **accused of everything from using artillery** to break out of jail in 2011 to **stealing chickens**. (Explainer: Why, 9 Jan.2014)

Isn't it so ridiculous to use the expression 'accused of everything from stealing artillery' to 'stealing chickens'? The reference to the ousted Morsi as 'Egypt's' 'first-democratically-elected' president shows the huge injustice inside the Egyptian judiciary, implicitly inciting people against it. It deliberately deforms the image of judges without awaiting the results of investigations:

[24] The allegations against the former president date back to December 2012, when protesters gathered outside the presidential palace, angry about a decree through which Morsi granted himself near-absolute powers. Hundreds of Morsi's supporters attacked the protest, and nine people were killed in the clashes that followed. (Explainer: Why, 9 Jan.2014)

It argues Morsi had nothing to do with those charges, not his fault, rather some supporters' _ Al-Jazeera clearly performs the role of Morsi's lawyer. Hence the question is raised 'Why Morsi on Trial?' Then AJE goes on, in the same text, to criticize sarcastically the judges of blaming the weather for a hearing delay, to the extent that the trial_ for the same kind of unacceptable, or rather silly, reasons_ would be expected to be delayed for months or probably years:

[25] A second hearing on January 8 was postponed: Authorities **blamed bad weather**, saying they could not fly him to Cairo from his prison in Alexandria. The trial is likely to **drag on for months, if not years...**On December 18, prosecutors added another set of charges against Morsi, accusing him of espionage in what they called "**the biggest conspiracy in the history of the nation**". (Explainer: Why , 9 Jan.2014)

In sum, AJE claims, he is unjustly accused of committing all the horrors and crimes of mankind, including but not restricted to 'the biggest conspiracy' in the Egyptian history. It depicts the prosecutors adding charges to an already never ending list of charges against Egypt's only president elected democratically.

Depending on exclusive and predictable events:

No one can deny that 'exclusive' airing and interviews are what made ALA and AJE so popular in the world. Who forgets the Israeli soldiers shooting the Palestinian Mohammed Al-Dorra in his father's arms? Interviews with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaada leaders are a famous brand of Al-Jazeera_ few minutes after September 11, 2001 Osama bin Laden was talking exclusively on its screen. Taliban and Isis leaders are famous faces on Al-Jazeera, to the extent

that it is accused of having a questionable relationship with terrorists. Covering the 'Arab Spring' revolutions is no exception.

However, provided that we are naïve and going to accept the coincidence, the only camera that aired live the events of September 11 and the two planes while crashing into the North and South towers of the World Trade Center was Al-Jazeera's, then how can we accept other similar co-incidences? The famous story of the vague, white, American, diplomatic cars which killed innocent young demonstrators on 28 January 2011 is an example in this regard. A camera again from a mysterious angle aired the accident. The story about the diplomatic car is denied by AJA and the Egyptian police is accused of similar actions according to videos on social media:

أظهر مقطع فيديو بثته قناة الجزيرة ومصدره ناشطون على الفيسبوك سيارة دبلوماسية تدهس مواطنين مصريين [26] أثناء احتجاجاتهم على نظام الرئيس المصري محمد حسني مبارك وتوقع بينهم إصابات. وقال الصحفي محمد إسماعيل لقناة الجزيرة إنه لم يتم التبليغ في أقسام الشرطة عن حادثة السيارة التي دهست المتظاهرين في أحد أحياء القاهرة يوم 28 يناير/كانون الثاني. ونفى إسماعيل احتمال أن تكون السيارة مسروقة من هيئة دبلوماسية في ظل الانتشار الأمني الذي كانت تشهده المنطقة القريبة من السفارتين الأميركية والبريطانية يوم وقوع الحادث.

على الصعيد نفسه نقلت مراسلة الجزيرة في واشنطن عن الخارجية الأميركية أن عربة تعود ملكيتها للسفارة الأميركية في القاهرة قد سرقت في 28 يناير/كانون الثاني.

وكانت مقاطع فيديو أخرى نشرت على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي قد أظهرت عربات لوزارة الداخلية المصرية وهي

تدهس محتجين مصريين بالطريقة نفسها. (Sayarah Diplomasya, 4 Feb. 2011)

The angle plus the professional quality of the video makes us compare between similarities between this situation and the kind of professional shooting in ISIS propaganda films of slaughtering innocents.

Counter Strategy:

Other mass media try to present the view contrary to the one-sided perspective Al-Jazeera supports_ if we agree that the first ideology is an agenda full of lies and it promotes conflict, then the opposite one is the truth and only the truth can lead to peace. One of them is Al Arabiya. It describes what happened on 30 June 2013 not as a coup, but as a real revolution brought about by the 'popular will' of Egyptians:

[27] The army **protected the popular will** during the January 25 revolution and handed Morsi power on June 30, 2012 after he was elected. As the political crisis deepened, the army intervened out of necessity, and not to carry out a coup as Morsi's supporters insist. (The aftermath of, 22 July 2013)

Egyptian army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, along with Ahmed al-Tayeb, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Pope Tawadros, head of the Coptic Church, and representatives of the Tamarrod campaign, announced on 4 July a plan for the aftermath of the events of 30 June 2013. Islamic parties, like al-Nour religious party, were also invited. This is a 'consensus', rather than a conflict, project:

[28] This shows that there is a desire for **consensus**, and that the regime does not seek to exclude anyone from this process. However, the Freedom and Justice party, the

Brotherhood's political wing, refused the calls for dialogue. (The aftermath of, 22 July 2013)

It adds that the Muslim Brotherhood is playing the role of the victim, but they cannot deceive the Egyptians anymore:

[29] The Brotherhood has played the role of the victim for a long time. But this will no longer work for them after the new union between them and the Salafi jihadists. The Brotherhood's alliance with violent groups exposes their lack of historical awareness. They have forgotten the pasts of other jihadist groups. ... **History proves that violent Jihadism will not succeed, and ultimately we await the failure of those who adopt it.** (The aftermath of, 22 July 2013)

Notice the smart reference to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as 'Brotherhood' without the adjective 'Muslim' in an attempt to keep Islam away from this dirty game of attracting naïve people in the name of Islam. So Al Arabiya uncovers the role played by MB as victims saying that the Egyptian people will be no longer deceived. History 'proves that violent Jihadism will not succeed'.

Al-Arabiya refutes the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) allegations that Rabaa sit-in was peaceful:

[30] Non- violence does not mean **building barricades to hold off the Egyptian riot police and breaking up pavement stones to throw at them.** BBC footage, shot at the very beginning of the confrontation but curiously not screened until after many hours of coverage of MB shows _before a shot was fired _ **pro-Morsi demonstrators attacking a bulldozer starting to break down the barricades with stones and long**

sticks until police firing tear gas forced them to retreat...(Misinformation about Egypt's, 15 August 2013)

It elaborates the true story of Rabaa events and explains why the sit-in cannot be considered peaceful. They built 'barricades to hold off the Egyptian riot police' and broke up 'pavement stones to throw at them', certainly not among the peaceful ways of expression. A witness from the BBC tells us about the MB protestors who attacked a bulldozer with stones and sticks to prevent it from breaking the barricades. It goes on to speak of the bystanders' testimonies.

[31] More significant is that **Egyptian bystanders** watching events from their balconies near the Nasr City intersection said they saw **armed men among the MB protestors**. None of this, not to mention the **blocking of traffic at major intersections for four weeks**, are examples of the "right to peaceful assembly" that the U.S. spokesman alluded to in his criticism of the Egyptian security and armed forces. (Misinformation about Egypt's, 15 August 2013)

The bystanders saw 'armed men among the MB protesters'. Some channels at that time aired live the dispersal and shot these armed men. Blocking the road and traffic constituted a major challenge to an alleged peaceful sit-in. Therefore the U.S. criticism of the Egyptian policemen in this connection becomes void and meaningless. Media like AJE and AJA hides the truth and presents a contrary image.

[32] In the last weeks of the sit-ins – almost as if to **provoke the authorities into action** – the MB would send out groups of a *few thousands* from either the Nahda Square sit-in or the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in to march upon government offices. In

several cases **the marches were confronted not by the riot police but by Egyptians living in the neighborhoods** where the MB protestors were **attempting to assault ministerial buildings**. And **that is the element that seems to be missing from so much of the discourse..** and who according to public opinion polls, wanted this sit-ins ended and life, tourism and jobs to come back to normal. And in Cairo that **opposition to the MB is overwhelming**. (Misinformation about Egypt's, 15 August 2013)

MB actually sought to provoke the authorities. And the 'millions' demonstrating in support of the MB cause did not exceed 'a few thousands' at best, simply because the Egyptian people uncovered their true bad intentions against Egypt and the Egyptians_ they don't feel they belong to Egypt, instead their loyalty goes to the Brotherhood organization. Some public opinion polls reveal the 'overwhelming' opposition against them.

Al Arabiya helps uncover the MB agenda of attacking the Egyptian judges:

[33] **A spate of attacks** on judges suggests they are **the latest targets of an insurgency** centered in North Sinai that has **killed hundreds of Egyptian soldiers and police in the past two years**. "It is wrong for the **tyrants** to jail our brothers," cleric Abu Osama al-Masry said, referring to judges. "**Poison their food... surveillance them at home and in the street... destroy their homes with explosives if you can.**" (Sinai militants, 21 May 2015)

Judges have been the target of MB campaign too, exactly as the army. MB supporters refer to judges as 'tyrants' who arrest innocent brothers and call for poisoning their food, following and observing them everywhere and destroying their homes. Is not this terrorism? It exceeds a so-called 'acts of violence'.

Al Arabiya depicts the trial of Morsi with all respect to the Egyptian judiciary. Look at the list of serious charges_ each deserves a death sentence_ from espionage, to getting secret information about the country's defense. The charges do not include 'everything' from 'espionage' to 'stealing chickens' as Al-Jazeera said:

[34] تستكمل محكمة جنبايات القاهرة، اليوم الأحد، محاكمة الرئيس الأسبق محمد مرسي و10 متهمين آخرين من أعضاء تنظيم الإخوان، في اتهامهم بالتخابر وتسريب وثائق ومستندات صادرة عن أجهزة الدولة السيادية إلى مؤسسة الرئاسة وإفشائها إلى دولة أجنبية. ..فقد أسندت النيابة إلى الرئيس الأسبق مرسي وبقية المتهمين اتهامات عديدة، من بينها: ارتكاب جرائم الحصول على سر من أسرار الدفاع، واختلاس الوثائق والمستندات الصادرة من الجهات السيادية للبلاد والمتعلقة بأمن الدولة وإخفائها وإفشائها إلى دولة أجنبية والتخابر معها بقصد الإضرار بمركز البلاد الحربي والسياسي والدبلوماسي والاقتصادي وبمصالحها القومية. (Esteanaf Mohakamet, 7 June 2015)

In addition, Morsi's supporters have used the trial as a reason to mobilize supporters and do all acts of violence and terrorism:

[35] وقالت الداخلية المصرية في بيانها، إن أجهزة الأمن، ترصد بكل دقة وجدية الدعوات التي تصدر عن عناصر تنظيم الإخوان وتتابع كافة التحركات والمخططات التي تستهدف إشاعة الفوضى في البلاد وتسعى لتعطيل مرافق الدولة ومصالح المواطنين وإعاقة حركة المرور (Al-Dakhiliya Tarsod, 2 Nov. 2013).

The arrested Morsi and other MB leaders don't respect judiciary. They scream, wave and insult the judges, judiciary and the army during the trials.

[36] وطوال الجلسة، هتف المتهمون "يسقط يسقط حكم العسكر" و"حسبي الله ونعم الوكيل" ما استدعى تعليق القاضي لجلسة المحاكمة قبل ان يستأنفها ويتنحى (Qadi Yatanaha, 11 Dec. 2013).

Al Arabiya logically presented the view favoring the Arab Spring and the opposite opinion so that the audience could understand the situation and pick

their choice as early as December 2011, i.e. before MB seized power. The argument goes:

[37] “The path towards democracy will only move forward,” said Majed. “It’s impossible for things to go back to coups and despotism after all that has happened.” Islamists are beginning to reap the benefits of the Arab Spring which was led by independent youths defying the myth of “oriental despotism.” But with Islamists who have always been suppressed by Arab autocrats aspiring to power in many countries, liberals are voicing **fears of a dark era ahead**. An argument dismissed by Majed.(Arab Spring ushers , 7 Dec. 2011)

The first opinion claims that the Muslim Brotherhood age would be democratic; any other alternative means going back to military coups and tyranny. The second, aware of the history of MB, expresses its fears of ‘a dark era’.

The major idea of the early theories of communication for development and modernization proved to be essentially a 'Westernization' project; but it could not be so explicitly and bluntly termed, 'Westernization', because Third World leaders and their peoples hated the West for political reasons as explained before. Thus this process was called 'modernization' and 'development' instead. All models of communication for development have failed in attaining development for Third World countries, generally speaking. All promises of modernization have proved to be only a smart cover for a Westernization agenda: the true 'Arab Spring'_ and fake aspirations for democratization, high standards of live, abolishing poverty, freedom, etc._ can be easily discerned in

a ruined Iraq and Syria, an ISIS-inhibited Libya, a divided Tunisia and Lebanon, a threatened Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt, a still-occupied Palestine, and the list goes on. Is this the promised dream of 'Arab Spring' or a nightmare of destructive 'chaos'? International conflicts are managed in such a way that serves the interests of big powers, no matter whether this violates international law, justice or *ex aequo et bono* principles. The Arab Spring revolutions agenda would be carried out by force at the expense of these countries. The attempts continue_ never give up_ despite the apparent failure in Egypt (the persistence of Al-Jazeera on its ideological stance assures the point in hand further). This implies that professionalism has been abused by international mass media to convey certain ideologies.

MaGarty et.al admit that the international broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera and the new developments in social media, like for instance the You Tube, enable the shaping of new social identities that can challenge social orders: "The recent revolutions known as the Arab Spring have been characterized as the products of social media" (2014: 725). This is exactly what the analysis of texts reveals and its elaboration of the role played by AJA and AJE to promote the West neo-colonial agenda indirectly.

A meticulous inspection of modernization discourse reveals the true Western intentions of replacing whatever non-Western values, ideological, social, economic, educational, political, religious and identity-related systems, with Western ones. But the difference between old colonization and neo-colonialism is that the former's discourse was negative while the latter's is positive in the

sense that it deceptively promises the other with development, welfare, modernization, etc. An inevitable question to be raised is: what is achieved in the Arab World since the Arabs have started to listen to the West discourse? Deterioration, division, starvation of the peoples, destruction of the state institution, etc. Nothing admirable indeed. Tipps (1973:204) writes about the changes which the West have sought to see in the Third World:

The interwoven changes are motivated by a combination of altruistic, ideological and political-economic motives, and all enable the West to manage, produce and organize the Third World politically, economically, socially, psychologically, scientifically, militarily, and perhaps above all, imaginatively.

In 1958 Lerner clarified, as I mentioned before, that the origin of the modernization project in mass media was a 'Westernization' process, which consisted of three components: a) mobile individuals whose psychological orientation facilitates their acceptance of rapid changes whether at the personal level or the societal; b) a potent mass media that accelerates these changes by means of disseminating ideas, values and attitudes leading to Westernization; and finally c) a correlation between urbanization (industrialization), media exposure, literacy, and economic and political participation (Melkote and Steeves 2008:114). Today more than any time else this idea manifests itself very well in the strong relationship between the attempts to control mass media and to maintain its North-South flow (i.e. power) and mass media effects on receivers. However, this does not refer implicitly to the inability of the Arab

World to face this flow. On the contrary, Al Arabiya is a good example here as it tries to present the truth as regards the issue at hand as much as it can. But unfortunately its powers are incomparable to the West's; it needs the concerted efforts of all the Arabs politically, economically, socially, culturally, religiously and ideologically.

At this point, translation emerges as a prominent player in this game. Ideological translation and the translation of ideology represent the means through which ideology reaches the receiver of another language (s). Fawcett says that if we define ideology as an 'action-oriented set of beliefs' and if we assume that those beliefs are political:

in the sense that their application establishes relations of dominance, then we can see how, throughout the centuries, individuals and institutions have applied their practical beliefs to the production of certain effects in translation. (2008:107)

We can understand then how translation has been exploited throughout history to produce certain effects on message receivers. Fawcett (2008:107) raises very simple but important questions about what should come to mind when translation is approached from an ideological perspective:

- What gets translated (what is involved and what is excluded)?
- Who does the translation (who controls the production of translation)?
- Who is it translated for (who is given access to foreign materials and who denied)?
- How is the material translated: what is omitted, added, altered, to control the message?

Hence translation can affect negatively (i.e. play a dysfunctional role in) or positively (play a functional role in) shaping and reshaping the audience awareness.

Niranjana (1992) suggests that the translator's task is similar to the historian. Using his own language, he should release that pure language which is under the spell of another, in other words he should liberate the imprisoned language through his translation (Gentzler 2001:180). She demands the post-colonial translator to be aware of every aspect of colonialism because this is not merely a question of avoiding Western ideological values and discourse, but it is also a method to dismantle the West from within, to deconstruct and identify the means that it uses to repress the non-West and marginalize its very otherness (Munday 2001:135). Simply, the translator must resist this policy of containment through discourse. Translators of these types of texts should be well-aware of which texts to be translated and the ideologies included. Moreover the translator, wherever possible, should provide target texts with contextual information in the form of a preface, an interview with the author and an afterword as many scholars suggest (cf. Niranjana and Spivak). In this sense translation becomes a mediation act on the part of the translator.

Apparently international actors, Al-Sorour (2012) states, from different backgrounds, stances and ideologies compete to attract the attention of mass media as a tool to achieve political influence; each tries to promote his own perspective of the conflict and mobilize people to politically support their cause. Hence comes the role of media in conflicts, be them revolutions,

rebellions, acts of violence or terrorism, demonstrations, turmoils, wars, international disputes, etc. Mass communication has become the strongest tool controlling the street and public opinion for it can present the sheer truth or participate in blacking out and shutting the mouths; Safwat Al-Alem, Professor of mass communications at Cairo University, explains that since the society is divided and there is no political will to finish off division, then the various parties would seek to dominate media and thus it turns to be a real party in the crisis (Al-Halabi 2012, Translated). Both mass media and translation, from the analysis of texts, seem to be dominated by the West, who sets the rules of the game for mass media and translation on the one hand. The non-West, on the other hand, seems to be on the defensive side to survive. The West insists on its conflict agenda; the non-West should work on peace instead. This conflict is as eternal as the presence of mankind on the earth. 'Who wins in the end?' is not the point, but to keep on trying matters more.

CONCLUSION

This paper aimed from the beginning to investigate the functional and dysfunctional roles of ideological translation and mass media in the Arab World and challenges naïve concepts of translation like 'faithfulness' and 'loyalty' to the text writer and of mass media like 'modernization', 'democratization', 'women empowerment', etc. It hypothesized that both translation and mass communication can play a functional role promoting modernization and development or a dysfunctional one promoting chaos and

conflict and that both have recently played a dysfunctional role in the Arab world.

This topic is under-researched. There is a gap in the literature on translation studies which account for the roles played by ideological translation from a non-Western perspective and mass media in the Third and Arab world societies. Bassnett and Trivedi (1999:5) describe the history of translation as 'the shameful history of translation'. Ideological translation studies have a significant potential and implications for the role of translation in conflict areas where grave distortions in message content, receivers' value and information system occur. In this context, postcolonial translation theory is a first step in changing the minds of people. Internationally-dominated mass media, like Al-Jazeera Arabic and English, promotes a neocolonial enterprise of conflicts and wars instead of modernization, development and peace. Al Arabiya as an example for confrontation media has tried to present the truth which will in turn enhance modernization and peace but it has a long way to go. The research hypotheses thus were proved right.

The paper recommends that future research on the roles of translation and mass media should approach the issue from various perspectives in order to enlighten us about their magnificent implications for Arab societies if they play a functional rather than a dysfunctional role.

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